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Abstract We examine stock sales as a managerial incentive to help explain the
discontinuity around the analyst forecast benchmark. We find that the likelihood of
just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast is strongly associated with
subsequent managerial stock sales. Moreover, we provide evidence that managers
manage earnings prior to just meeting the threshold and selling their shares. Finally,
the relation between just meeting and subsequently selling shares does not hold for
non-manager insiders, who arguably cannot affect the earnings outcome, and is
weaker in the presence of an independent board, suggesting that good corporate
governance mitigates this strategic behavior.
Keywords Analyst forecasts Æ Earnings Æ Managerial compensation Æ
Insider trading Æ Corporate governance
JEL Classification M41 Æ J33 Æ G34
A disproportionately large number of firms just meet or beat earnings thresholds
relative to the number of firms that just miss these thresholds, a phenomenon that
many studies interpret as earnings management (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Hayn,
1995). A key assumption underlying the earnings management interpretation of the
kinks in the earnings thresholds is that managers benefit in some way by meeting the
thresholds (e.g., Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999). In this paper, we examine
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managerial stock sales as a managerial benefit from meeting the analyst forecast
threshold.
A significant portion of managerial compensation in the U.S. is in the form of
stock-based compensation, and prior literature shows that short-run stock prices are
sensitive to meeting analyst forecasts (Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002; Kasznik &
McNichols, 2002; Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Such positive investor reaction to just
meeting the analyst forecast creates a favorable environment for managers who plan
to sell their shares, thus prompting these managers to exert additional effort to just
meet the analyst forecast when they otherwise would have missed the benchmark
(Jensen, 2004). Our main prediction, therefore, is that management’s upcoming
insider sales can help explain the earnings discontinuity around the analyst forecast
threshold.
We test our prediction on a sample of 21,952 firm quarters from 1990–1999 that
just met (by zero or one cent) or just missed (by one or two cents) the quarterly
analyst forecast. Our main result is that the likelihood of just meeting versus just
missing the analyst forecast is strongly associated with subsequent managerial stock
sales. Sales by managers of the ‘‘just met’’ firms (scaled by shares owned) are about
56% higher than those of the ‘‘just missed’’ firms. The difference remains significant
after controlling for firm-specific and managerial factors such as performance, equity
issuances, long-term growth prospects, and lagged insider sales.
We consider our finding to be evidence that managers are strategic. That is, we
assume managers anticipate that the market will react differently when the analyst
forecast is just missed versus just met, and undertake actions to meet the analyst
forecast in order to boost their proceeds from insider sales. An alternative expla-
nation for this empirical result, however, is that insiders sell after good performance
(e.g., Heath, Huddart, & Lang, 1999). In other words, the transactions could be a
passive response to performance rather than a planned event (Seyhun, 1998, Chapter
2). If we could directly measure the ex ante managerial intent to sell shares, our
supposition of causality—that managers who intend to sell shares are more likely to
undertake actions to meet the analyst forecast—would be on much stronger grounds.
However, managerial intent is hard to measure directly and must be inferred from
observable managerial activities such as ex post managerial sales.1 We therefore
conduct several additional tests to demonstrate that our findings do not just reflect
passive insider trading in response to performance.
First, we control for variables we expect to be associated with just meeting the
analyst forecast and insider trading: lagged managerial sales, profitability, stock re-
turns, growth, equity issuances, and firm size. Next, we examine how managers who
sell shares meet analyst forecasts. If managers strategically meet the analyst forecast
in anticipation of selling their shares, then we may find evidence of earnings or
forecast management to meet the analyst forecast. We examine discretionary
working capital accruals (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994) and the unexpected
earnings forecast measure developed in Matsumoto (2002). In support of managers
1 The inability to measure a manager’s intent or ‘‘scienter’’ directly is well known in the legal
literature (Bainbridge, 2000). Economists (and lawyers) therefore use the concept of ‘‘revealed
preference’’ to infer intent from various patterns in observed data (Kreps, 1990, Chapter 2). From an
institutional perspective, the only ex ante disclosure that managers have to file is Form 144, in which
they document their intent to sell. However, managers are not obligated to sell all the shares they say
they will, so most managers just keep a large open balance of shares on Form 144. Therefore, we
cannot use Form 144 as a measure of the intent to sell.
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actively exerting effort to meet the analyst forecast before selling their shares, we
find that firms where managers sell more shares in the following quarter are sig-
nificantly more likely to meet the analyst forecast threshold using discretionary
working capital accruals. More interesting, this result does not hold for non-mana-
gerial insiders such as directors and large shareholders. This is important because
these insiders, unlike managers, have little power to manage earnings at their con-
venience (i.e., when they want to sell). Thus, the accrual results are strongly sug-
gestive of strategic behavior by managers and not the passive performance
alternative.
Another way for managers to meet the analyst forecast, as Richardson, Teoh and
Wysocki, (2004) argue, is to manage analyst expectations. Though we find evidence
of downward analyst forecast guidance for firms that just met versus just missed the
analyst forecast, we do not find evidence that they manage analyst forecasts
downward more when managers sell shares.
If managers are acting opportunistically, we expect managers in well-governed
firms to be less able to manipulate the outcome in their favor before selling shares.
Along these lines, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Bushman and Smith
(2001) argue that if a given managerial behavior is driven by opportunism (as
opposed to alternative hypotheses such as the performance effect), such behavior
should be less prevalent in firms with good corporate governance. We therefore
examine whether our results are weaker in well-governed firms.
We use board composition as our measure of corporate governance, following
Klein (2002), who finds that board composition mitigates earnings management (also
see Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). We find that managers’ propensity to sell
after just meeting analyst forecasts is weaker in firms with a majority representation
of outsiders on the boards, once again suggesting that our findings reflect strategic
managerial behavior rather than the passive performance alternative.
In sum, by focusing on managerial incentives around the discontinuity, our evi-
dence thus provides a direct test of models (e.g., Degeorge et al., 1999; Guttman,
Kadan, & Kandel, 2006) that implicate managers’ incentives as a key factor behind
the observed patterns of earnings discontinuities. Thus, our paper adds to the debate
on the underlying cause of the discontinuities (Ayers, Jiang, & Yeung, 2006; Beaver,
McNichols, & Nelson, 2003; Bhojraj, Hribar, & Picconi, 2003; Dechow, Richardson,
& Tuna, 2000; Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, 2003; Durtschi & Easton, 2005; Ke,
2004; Phillips, Pincus, & Rego, 2003).2
Our study also adds to the insider trading literature. A major focus of this liter-
ature is to explore whether insider sales are informative about future firm perfor-
mance (Beneish & Vargus, 2002; Beneish, Press, & Vargus, 2004; Ke, 2004; Ke,
Huddart, & Petroni, 2003; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Noe, 1999; Piotroski & Roul-
stone, 2005; Roulstone, 2004; Seyhun, 1998). Our study is somewhat different in that
2 Durtschi and Easton (2005) has the greatest relevance in our setting, as our focus is on the zero
analyst forecast error discontinuity. They argue that the kink around zero analyst forecast error is
largely driven by analyst optimism versus pessimism—essentially that when analysts miss, they miss
big, creating a dearth of observations in the just missed region that is not necessarily due to earnings
management. Their conjecture does not prohibit our examination of this region. The shortage of
firms in this region should only serve to weaken the power of our tests, as we examine whether
managers who would have just missed exert additional effort to jump the hurdle when they plan to
sell their shares. Our claim is not that the discontinuity around the zero analyst forecast is exclusively
due to earnings management, but that trading incentives accentuate this kink.
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we are not interested in earnings subsequent to insider sales. Rather, we attempt to
explain earnings patterns prior to insider sales. Several recent papers have taken this
route. For example, Summers and Sweeney (1998) and Beneish (1999) examine
earnings prior to insider sales in the extreme cases of earnings fraud and SEC
enforcement actions, respectively, and Bartov and Mohanram (2004) find that
earnings are abnormally high prior to option exercises.
Finally, our study speaks to the role of earnings in managerial compensation.
Because earnings are a key determinant of stock prices, earnings affect compensa-
tion both directly through earnings-based contractual arrangements, and indirectly
through stock-price contracts. As evidence of the direct effect, Matsunaga and Park
(2001) find that managers’ cash bonuses increase with meeting analyst forecasts. Our
study provides evidence of the indirect effect by showing that managers’ proceeds
from insider sales increase with meeting analyst forecasts and thereby affect their
decision to meet this threshold.3
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Reviewing the literature, we
develop our hypotheses in Sect. 1. We explain our data in Sect. 2. Section 3 contains
our empirical results, and the final section concludes.
1 Hypothesis development
1.1 Model
In general, it is difficult to provide incontrovertible evidence that reported earnings
in a given situation reflect active earnings management and not genuine firm per-
formance (e.g., McNichols, 2000). Consequently, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and
Degeorge et al. (1999) concentrate on a narrower setting, and point to jumps in the
population density of firms around earnings thresholds such as analyst forecasts and
zero earnings as evidence of earnings management.
Our paper examines whether managerial incentives can help explain these dis-
continuities. We use the framework provided in Degeorge et al. (1999) to motivate
our empirical analyses. Degeorge et al. (1999) present a two-period model of
earnings management (hereafter the model), where managers maximize their per-
sonal payoff. The model assumes that the manager’s expected reward schedule falls
sharply at one or more thresholds. Thus, when latent earnings are slightly below the
earnings threshold, the manager is expected to manage earnings upward.
To test the model, therefore, we need (a) an earnings threshold, and (b) a clear
threshold-related reward schedule. The business press and CEO surveys indicate
that meeting analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings was the key earnings threshold in
the 1990s (e.g., Berenson, 2003; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Recent
accounting literature is also consistent with this assertion (Brown & Caylor, 2005;
Dechow et al., 2003). Therefore, we focus primarily on the analyst forecast threshold
(though we examine other earnings thresholds in Sect. 3.5).
3 In related work, Ke (2004) examines the prior earnings threshold and finds that managers with
more equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings to report longer earnings strings. Ke
(2004) also finds that these managers sell significant amounts of stock in the two to six quarters prior
to a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases. Cheng and Warfield (2005) also examine the
role of managerial motives in the context of the analyst forecast error discontinuity. They find that
managers with high levels of equity incentives are more likely to have met the analyst forecast.
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The second feature of the model is that the manager’s welfare depends on
meeting the threshold, and managers with greater net personal benefits to meeting
the threshold will be more likely to manage earnings. We use stock sales as our
measure of managerial incentives, for several reasons. First, stock-based compen-
sation arrangements such as options and shares have been a significant source of
incentives for managers in recent years (Hall & Liebman, 1998; Ofek & Yermack,
2000). Second, prior literature has documented a direct link between equity prices
and meeting the analyst forecast (Freeman & Tse, 1992; Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik
& McNichols, 2002; Skinner & Sloan, 2002).4 Thus, the ability to sell stock at
favorable terms provides managers a natural threshold-related reward schedule.5
1.2 Institutional costs
Clearly, an institutional cost confronting all insiders in their sales decisions is the
possibility of insider trading penalties. Insider trading laws such as the 1988 Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act basically prohibit stock trades by any
person deemed to be an insider while in possession of material, nonpublic infor-
mation (Garfinkel, 1997; Seyhun, 1998). Most insider trading investigations are
spurred by insider trading that occurs before announcements of earnings, dividends,
or takeovers (Seyhun, 1998). Many firms, therefore, have adopted insider trading
blackout periods to reduce the likelihood of insider trading infractions (Bainbridge,
2000). As Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) document, such blackout periods typ-
ically occur before the earnings announcement. By contrast, we examine insider
trading that occurs after the earnings announcement. Furthermore, Bartov et al.
(2002) show that firms just meeting the earnings threshold (even with accruals)
receive an equity premium that persists for at least three years. Thus our setting
provides a convenient way for insiders to strategically sell shares without triggering
price-drop based penalties.6
1.3 Hypothesis development
We are by no means the first to suggest that managers undertake actions to heighten
the value of their stock or stock-based compensation—it is a charge often made in
4 These empirical studies are validated by theoretical work that shows that stock prices are
extraordinarily sensitive to small events such as firms just missing earnings thresholds. This theo-
retical result obtains both when a) investors have behavioral biases (e.g., Rabin, 2002), and (b) when
investors are rational, but have incomplete information about the firm’s future prospects (Hart &
Kreps, 1986; Stein, 1987). The intuition in Hart and Kreps (1986) is that speculators are always in
search of the ‘‘the next big stock,’’ resulting in extreme volatility in price relative to small changes in
fundamentals.
5 We realize that in a more complex setting, a rational forward-looking manager will conduct a long-
range optimization, weighing the impact of managing earnings today on future period earnings and
future period stock incentive dynamics. We abstract from this complex setting and focus on a single
period setting (see Bolton, Scheinkman, & Xiong, 2006 for a multi-period model).
6 To shed light on the possibility of price-drop-based penalties, we examine the subsequent returns
following the trades by management, beginning one day following the managerial trade and ending
one day before the manager files the trade with the SEC. The subsequent market-adjusted returns
following managerial sales, though significantly lower than for those where the manager purchased
shares, remain positive. This finding is consistent with Bartov et al. (2002)—that regardless of how
the benchmark is met, there is a premium to meeting the benchmark. This premium alleviates
concerns about price-drop-based insider trading penalties.
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the business press (e.g., Berenson, 2003). There is also systematic evidence that stock
incentives, both in levels and flows, drive managerial opportunism. With respect to
stock holding levels, Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) find that managers with
higher proportions of stock-based compensation and greater pay-for-performance
sensitivity are more likely to commit earnings fraud, and Gao and Shrieves (2002)
and Cheng and Warfield (2005) show that firms that offer high levels of stock
compensation are more likely to have high discretionary accruals. Likewise, Ke
(2004) finds that CEOs with higher levels of stock compensation are more likely to
manage earnings to sustain strings of earnings increases.
The effect of earnings management on stock price is likely to have a finite hori-
zon, due to factors such as subsequent accrual reversal. Therefore, managers
undertaking earnings management to heighten prices must reap the benefits in this
horizon. Consequently, the liquid part (or flow) of managerial shareholdings can
matter more than the illiquid holdings. Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) make this
point analytically by showing that managers’ motives to change the stock price are
associated with the number of shares they wish to trade in the current period, and
not their holdings. Prior empirical literature also suggests that managers manage
earnings and investor perceptions of firm fundamentals both prior to stock or option
inflows (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000; Baker, Collins, & Reitenga, 2003; Yermack,
1997), and prior to stock or option outflows (Bartov & Mohanram, 2004; Beneish,
1999; Ke, 2004; Summers & Sweeney, 1998).
We expect managers to anticipate the differential price reaction to just missing
versus just meeting the analyst forecast and exert additional effort to meet the
analyst forecast when they plan to sell shares following the earnings announcement.
We develop this idea through several stages, and our first hypothesis is:
H1 Firms that just met the analyst forecast earnings threshold have higher mana-
gerial insider sales following the earnings announcement relative to firms that just
missed this threshold.
We posit that managers exert additional effort to meet the analyst forecast and
then sell shares (hereafter active trading). In the event that our findings are con-
sistent with Hypothesis 1, a competing explanation is one of reverse causality. Prior
behavioral research (e.g., Heath et al., 1999) indicates that managers are more likely
to sell when stock prices have risen, which is more likely for firms that have just met
rather than just missed the analyst forecast. Following Seyhun (1998, Chapter 2), we
call this passive trading. Clearly active and passive trading are not mutually exclu-
sive, but we want to ensure that our main result is not driven entirely by passive
trading.
As a first step towards resolving this issue, we include several controls for per-
formance in our test of Hypothesis 1, such as past and current stock returns. To
further distinguish between active and passive trading, we present three additional
tests. First, we examine how managers meet thresholds. We posit that under active
trading, managers will exert effort, through either earnings management or forecast
management, to meet the analyst forecast.7 Under passive trading, however, there is
7 Forecast management is the lowering of the analyst forecast to a beatable level through guidance
by managers (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; Cotter, Tuna, & Wysocki, 2004; Matsumoto, 2002; Richardson
et al., 2004).
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no anticipated systematic relation with outcome management. Therefore, if we find
evidence that managers use earnings or forecast management to just meet the
analyst forecast before selling shares, we have more confidence in the strategic
interpretation of our findings. Thus, our second hypothesis is:
H2 Managers who sell stock following the earnings announcement are more likely to
manage earnings or forecasts to just meet the analyst forecast earnings threshold.
While our focus is on managerial insiders, the definition of insiders also includes
other parties such as directors and large shareholders. These non-managerial insiders
are likely to have less power to manage earnings at their convenience (i.e., when
they want to sell) compared to managers. However, if our results are merely a result
of passive responses to performance, we expect the result to hold for non-managers.
Thus, our third hypothesis is:
H3 The association between the likelihood of meeting the analyst forecast and
stock sales following the earnings announcement is stronger for managers’ stock sales
than for non-manager insiders’ stock sales.
If insiders sell opportunistically, an immediate question is why shareholders do
not prevent this opportunistic behavior. Good corporate governance is a prominent
tool that shareholders use to reduce managerial opportunism and corporate mis-
reporting (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Klein, 2002). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001,
p. 903) argue that one way to explore if a given managerial behavior reflects
opportunism as opposed to other explanations (such as passive performance based
trading) is to determine whether such behavior is mitigated in well-governed firms.
This leads to our fourth and final hypothesis:
H4 Firms with poor corporate governance have a stronger association between
managers’ insider sales and the likelihood of just meeting versus just missing the
analyst forecast.
2 Data and variable definitions
2.1 Data
We study the period 1990–1999. The 1990s saw high levels of stock-based com-
pensation for management (Ofek & Yermack, 2000; Rose & Wolfram, 2000), sug-
gesting that these managers had strong stock-based motives for earnings
management. We obtain open market insider trades from Thomson Financial
(available through Wharton Research Data Services). This database identifies in-
sider transactions both by the type of transaction (e.g., open market sales or open
market purchases) and by insider type (e.g., management, non-management). We
obtain financial data from the 2003 Quarterly Compustat File, and analyst forecasts,
reported actual earnings, and long-term growth estimates from the 2003 I/B/E/S
Unadjusted Summary File. We obtain the proceeds from equity issuances from SDC
Platinum. Finally, we obtain our corporate governance measure from the Investor
Research Responsibility Center’s (IRRC) corporate governance dataset. To be
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included in the sample, the firm must be a December year-end firm (to aid in the
matching of I/B/E/S and Compustat quarters) and have non-missing data for each of
the independent variables used to test Hypothesis 1.
2.2 Variable definitions
2.2.1 Main variables
Our two main variables are (1) whether the manager just met versus just missed the
analyst forecast (Meetq) and (2) the magnitude of insider sales following the earnings
announcement (Mgr_Salesq+1). Meetq is an indicator variable that is equal to one if
the quarterly consensus analyst forecast error is equal to zero or one cent and zero if
the forecast error is equal to negative one or negative two cents. We focus on the un-
scaled forecast error following Degeorge et al. (1999) and Kasznik and McNichols
(2002). The un-scaled error is what investors see and is therefore most likely to affect
prices.8
As our focus is on the discontinuity around the analyst forecast threshold, we
include only those firms that are just around this threshold. A potential concern with
our analysis is that the firms which would have ‘‘just missed’’ the analyst forecast
may have taken a ‘‘big bath.’’ We would miss such firms in our sample. However, it is
important to note that the majority of big bath expenses, such as asset write-offs, are
considered transitory by analysts. I/B/E/S earnings, both forecasts and realizations,
tend to exclude these transitory charges. Therefore, while managers of just missed
firms may choose to take big baths, we expect the majority of these firms to continue
to be classified as ‘‘just missed’’ firms in our sample.9
Turning to the measurement of insider trades, we use realized insider sales in our
analyses.10 Because quarter q earnings are released in quarter q + 1, we measure
insider sales from the day after the earnings announcement until the end of the
quarter (Fig. 1).11 Each firm has many officers, each of whom can make multiple
trades each quarter. We therefore must generate a summary statistic of this insider
8 The quarterly consensus analyst forecast is the median EPS forecast computed over the set of the
analysts’ most recent forecasts that are no earlier than two months before the quarterly earnings
release date. This procedure avoids the problem of stale analyst forecasts. We use the unadjusted I/
B/E/S forecasts to avoid losing the precision in the decimal places of the forecasts due to the I/B/E/S
adjustments of prior forecasts for subsequent stock splits (Baber & Kang, 2002; Payne & Thomas,
2003). Actual earnings realizations are also obtained from I/B/E/S. Note that stock splits are not an
issue for insider stock sales because we scale this measure by contemporaneous insider stock
holdings.
9 Also note that our tests include all firm-quarters in which the firm just met or just missed the analyst
forecast. We do not use a matched sample approach, which Palepu (1986) argues biases the results by
distorting the baseline proportions of the treatment firms.
10 The use of realized outcomes as a proxy for intent is widespread in studies that examine earnings
patterns prior to an event such as stock issuance, option grants and cash pay (e.g., Aboody &
Kasznik, 2000; Rangan, 1998; Teoh, Welch & Wong, 1998). In all these cases, when managers take
the action prior to the event, they are anticipating that the event of interest will subsequently
happen. Like our study, these studies use the actual realization of the event in their empirical tests,
not the managers’ ex ante anticipation.
11 Ke et al. (2003) use a similar trading window (see pp. 322–323). Results are not sensitive to using
the entire quarter, which is reasonable, because insiders typically do not sell prior to earnings
releases. In our sample, 92% of all manager insider trades in a quarter (and 88% of non-manager
insider trades) occur after the earnings announcement in that quarter.
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trading data. Prior literature does not appear to have converged on an appropriate
summary statistic of insider trading data, and each measure has its limitations
(Seyhun, 1998, Chapter 1). For example, Noe (1999) uses the square root of the
dollar value of insider sales, while Beneish and Vargus (2002) use the net number of
shares traded scaled by total shares outstanding, and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) use
net purchases scaled by total number of trades. In Bar-Gill and Bebchuk’s (2003)
model, the manager’s opportunistic behavior is a function of the percentage of his
shareholdings he intends to unwind—the greater the proportion of intended sales,
the greater the incentive for managers to exert effort to increase the price—and
none of the above empirical metrics account for insider ownership. Consequently,
recent empirical insider trading studies such as Jenter (2005) scale net purchases by
managers’ holdings. The scaling also facilitates comparison across firms with dif-
ferent levels of managerial ownership and insider sales. Therefore, we measure
insider sales as a proportion of managerial ownership. For each firm quarter, we
define net open market insider sales as:
Mgr Salesqþ1 ¼
XI;H
i¼1;h¼1
ðSSih=SHihÞ 
XI;H
i¼1;h¼1
ðSPih=SHihÞ
" #
where SSih, SPih, SHih are shares sold in the open market, purchased in the open
market, and held by officer i for each post-announcement trade h for the given firm
in the given quarter.12
Quarter q Quarter q + 1 
Measurement of Insider Sales
Earnings Announcement
for Quarter q
Fig. 1 Timeline of events
12 The officer shareholdings listed on the SEC filing of a trade can sometimes be very small. To
mitigate the generation of outliers due to this small denominator effect, we add back the shares
traded in a transaction to the corresponding ownership level figure for all observations. We also
exclude option exercises, because the conversion of an option to a share is not really a true purchase.
Of course, we include all sales of such shares. Finally, note that we ignore option holdings in the
denominator, because the insider trading data do not include option holdings. Substantiating the
validity of our metric, alternative insider trading measures such as the square root of the dollar value
of insider sales (Noe, 1999, p. 311), and the Net Shares Traded metric (Beneish & Vargus, 2002, p.
761) are correlated with our metric at .86 and .94, respectively.
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2.2.2 Control variables
We regress the meet or beat indicator on managerial sales and an array of
control variables, which we now motivate and define; data items are in paren-
theses and correspond to quarterly Compustat unless otherwise noted. First, we
include lagged insider sales as a regressor so that our results cannot be attributed
to steady-state differences in insider sales across the firms in our sample (e.g.,
some managers may be selling more shares because they receive more option-based
pay (Ofek & Yermack, 2000)). Recent studies have focused on ‘‘abnormal’’
insider trading (e.g., Bartov & Mohanram, 2004; Beneish et al., 2004); by
including lagged insider sales, we are effectively conducting a similar test.
In addition, we explicitly control for several variables that potentially influence
both the insider sales regressor and whether or not a firm just misses versus just
meets the earnings benchmark. Degeorge et al. (1999) find that meeting the analyst
forecast is not as important if the firm does not achieve the zero profit benchmark.
We therefore include Profitq, an indicator variable that is equal to one if actual
earnings in quarter q, as reported by I/B/E/S, is greater than or equal to zero, and
zero otherwise.
In addition to Profitq, we use several additional metrics to control for the per-
formance alternative. Return on Assets (ROAq) is the operating income before
depreciation (#21) for quarter q divided by the average total assets (#44) in quarter
q. We include the raw quarterly stock return (Return) in quarter q and q + 1. We
also include Volumeq+1, measured as the average daily trading volume for quarter
q + 1. Volumeq+1 is intended to control for the possibility that insider sales simply
mirror overall trading levels in the stock.
We include LTGt, which is the most recent analyst forecast of long-term growth
from I/B/E/S at the beginning of year t, and BMq, the book to market ratio as of the
end of quarter q, calculated as book value of equity (#59) divided by price (#14)
times shares outstanding (#61). These are important controls because high-growth
firms are more likely to have an extreme stock price response to missing forecasts
(Skinner and Sloan, 2002), and insider selling is increasing in the growth opportu-
nities of the stock (e.g., Ke et al., 2003).
Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) document that managers manage earnings
to boost share price in order to issue equity at favorable prices. Firm characteristics
such as LTGt indirectly control for equity issuances, because financing needs differ
systematically across firm types. We also explicitly control for external financing with
SEO$q+1, which is equal to proceeds received from equity issuances in quarter q + 1
scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of quarter q + 1. As a size
control we include Assetsq, measured as the log of total assets at the end of quarter q.
We include year-specific indicator variables because the proportion of small positive
earnings surprises versus small negative earnings surprises has increased over time
(Brown, 2001). Finally, we include indicator variables for each two-digit SIC code in
the sample to control for any additional industry effects.
2.2.3 Earnings and forecast management variables
We measure earnings management with discretionary working capital accruals (e.g.,
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). We focus on working capital accruals rather than total
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accruals because we are trying to pick up last-minute adjustments made by man-
agement to reach the analyst forecast. In addition, managers have more discretion
over working capital accruals (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). We estimate discre-
tionary working capital accruals (DWC) by estimating the following regression
equation:
WC=Assets ¼ b0ð1=AssetsÞ þ b1ððDCash SalesÞ=AssetsÞ þ e ð1Þ
Working capital accruals (WC) is equal to (DCurrent Assets (#40) – DCash
(#36)) – (DCurrent Liabilities (#49) – DCurrent Portion of Debt (#45)). Assets is
total assets (#44), and DCash Sales is equal to (DRevenue (#2) – DReceivables
(#37)). All changes are from the prior quarter, as is total assets. We estimate Eq. 1
by quarter and industry (two-digit SIC code) and decile rank the resulting residual
(DWC). To be included, each industry quarter must have at least ten observa-
tions.13
Our second management variable is forecast guidance, the downward guidance
of analyst forecasts to beatable levels. Prior research has found that managers, on
average, use analyst forecast guidance to meet the analyst forecast (e.g., Bartov
et al., 2002; Cotter et al., 2004; Matsumoto, 2002; Richardson et al., 2004). We
use the measure developed in Matsumoto (2002) to capture forecast guidance.
The unexpected forecast (UEF) is equal to the actual analyst forecast less the
expected analyst forecast, UEF = F – E[Fq] where F is the analyst forecast error
and E[Fq] is the expected forecast error, equal to EPSq-4 + E[DEPSq] with
E[DEPSq] equal to [a + b1(DEPSq-1/Pq-5) + b2 CRETq] · Pq-4, where CRET is
the current quarter return, and P is price—see Matsumoto (2002) for a more
detailed description. We multiply the unexpected forecast (UEF) by negative one
so that it is directionally the same as our earnings management measure—both
metrics increase with management. As with discretionary working capital accru-
als, we decile rank UEF.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. Our sample consists of 21,952 firm-quarter
observations that just met or just missed the analyst forecast from 1990–1999. To
mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize each of our variables at 1% and 99%, by
year. Significantly more firms (n = 15,183) just meet or beat earnings forecasts than
just miss (n = 6,769), consistent with Degeorge et al. (1999). More important, our
metric of insider sales jumps from .344 to .537, a 56% increase.
Table 2 provides the correlations between our dependent and independent vari-
ables. Insider trades by managers are correlated with insider trades by non-managers
and with each of our remaining control variables, warranting these variables’
inclusion in our empirical analyses.
13 Hribar and Collins (2002) prescribe the cash flow method to calculate accruals. However, using
quarterly data, the cash flow method for our sample period results in a reduction of more than half of
the sample. We do, however, replicate our results on this subset of the sample and note our results in
Sect. 3.2.
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3 Results
3.1 Meeting analyst forecasts
Our main regression specification is:
ProbðMeetqÞ ¼f ðc0 þ c1Mgr Salesqþ1 þ c2Mgr Salesq þ c3Profitq þ c4ROAq
þ c5Returnq þ c6Returnqþ1 þ c7Volumeqþ1 þ c8LTGt þ c9BMq
þ c10SEO$qþ1 þ c11LogðAssetsqÞ þ RTt¼1c12tYear
þ RKk¼1c13kSIC 2DIGITÞ ð2Þ
where Fðc0XÞ ¼ ½ec0X=ð1 þ ec0XÞ
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the sample firms
Variables Total Sample (n = 21,952) Just met the
analyst forecast
(n = 15,183)
Just missed the
analyst forecast
(n = 6,769)
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Mean Median Mean Median
Mgr_Salesq+1 .478 .000 .224 –1.612 13.863 .537 .000 .344*** .000***
Nmgr_Salesq+1 .208 .000 1.202 –3.585 10.000 .235 .000 .147*** .000***
Profitq .935 1.000 .246 .000 1.000 .950 1.000 .902*** 1.000***
ROAq .035 .034 .031 –.176 .134 .037 .037 .030*** .031***
Returnq .030 .023 .219 –.597 1.423 .038 .029 .012*** .007***
Returnq+1 .027 .017 .227 –.656 1.462 .035 .024 .008*** .003***
Volumeq+1 26.002 8.653 51.010 .174 493.580 27.573 9.384 22.477*** 7.459***
LTGt .184 .150 .102 .010 .700 .190 .160 .169*** .150***
BMq .480 .423 .317 –.423 3.069 .459 .403 .526*** .473***
SEO$q+1 .002 .000 .018 .000 .222 .002 .000 .001*** .000***
Log(Assetsq) 6.472 6.280 1.930 2.743 11.449 6.458 6.251 6.503* 6.343**
***, **, * The difference between the sub-groups is statistically significant at a two-tailed p-value
£ .0001, p = .03, or p = .11, respectively, under a t-test (shown on mean value above) or Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (shown on median value above).
The total sample consists of 21,952 firm-quarter observations that just missed or just met the con-
sensus analyst quarterly forecast from 1990–1999. The Just Met and Just Missed samples consist of
15,183 and 6,769 firm-quarter observations, respectively. We define the quarterly consensus analyst
forecast as the median EPS forecast for the current quarter q computed over the set of the most
recent analyst forecasts that are no earlier than two months before the quarterly earnings release
date. Just Met is comprised of firms that beat the analyst forecast by zero or one cent. Just Missed
contains those firms that missed the analyst forecast by one or two cents (computed from I/B/E/S
data). Mgr(Nmgr)_Salesq+1 is the net shares sold as a percentage of shares owned, summed over all
manager (non-manager) insiders in the firm; all insider transactions are open market. Profitq is an
indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S actual earnings for quarter q are greater than or equal to
zero, and zero otherwise. ROAq is operating income before depreciation for quarter q scaled by the
average total assets for quarter q. Returnq is the raw stock return for quarter q. Volumeq+1 is the
average daily trading volume (in millions) for quarter q + 1. LTGt is the analysts’ long-term EPS
growth estimate provided by I/B/E/S at the beginning of year t. BMq is the book to market ratio at
the end of quarter q. SEO$q+1 is the proceeds from equity issuances in quarter q + 1 scaled by the
market value of equity at the beginning of quarter q + 1. Assetsq is total assets (in millions) at the
end of quarter q. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%
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Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecast
Table 3 presents our results. Overall, the regression model has significant
explanatory power (the Likelihood Ratio statistic is significant at less than .001).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that executives who sell shares have a greater incentive to
meet the analyst forecast. In support of Hypothesis 1, in Table 3, Column 1, the
coefficient on Mgr_Salesq+1 is .033 (p-value = .005). Turning to the control variables,
lagged managerial sales is not a significant explanatory variable, suggesting that
timing matters—it is not merely the steady state level of insider trades that is
associated with just meeting the analyst forecast. Further, consistent with Degeorge
et al. (1999), firms are more likely to just meet (versus just miss) the analyst forecast
if they had nonnegative earnings. High-performing firms are more likely to just meet
the analyst forecast, as are high-growth firms and firms that are planning to issue
equity.14 Finally, larger firms are more likely to meet the analyst forecast.
Table 3 Logistic regression of the probability of just meeting versus just missing analyst forecasts on
managerial insider sales
Independent variables Predicted
sign
Dependent variable = Meetq
All firms that
just met or
just missed the
analyst forecast
Firms with non-zero
insider trading that
just met or just missed
the analyst forecast
Logit estimate
(Pr > X2)
Logit estimate (Pr > X2)
Intercept .358 (.198) –.036 (.930)
Mgr_Salesq+1 (+) .033 (.005) .024 (.071)
Mgr_Salesq –.000 (.969) –.010 (.458)
Profitq .431 (.001) .483 (.001)
ROAq 6.440 (.001) 7.296 (.001)
Returnq .617 (.001) .778 (.001)
Returnq+1 .778 (.001) .774 (.001)
Volumeq+1 –.001 (.125) –.001 (.100)
LTGt 1.867 (.001) 2.524 (.001)
BMq –.268 (.001) –.325 (.001)
SEO$q+1 2.589 (.010) 1.536 (.286)
Log(Assetsq) .067 (.001) .066 (.002)
Year Dummies Included Included
Two-digit SIC Dummies Included Included
Number of observations 21,952 9,012
Likelihood ratio 1,452.46 (.001) 684.87 (.001)
The total sample consists of 21,952 firm-quarter observations that just missed or just met the con-
sensus analyst quarterly forecast from 1990–1999. Meetq is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm’s realized I/B/E/S EPS beats the analyst forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses
the analyst forecast by one or two cents. See Table 1 for additional variable definitions. All signif-
icance levels are two-tailed
14 Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that high-growth firms have a more negative stock price reaction to
missing versus meeting the analyst forecast than non-high-growth firms. Consistent with these firms
having a greater incentive to meet the analyst forecast, we find that growth, as a control variable, is
positively associated with just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast. However, it is also
possible that there is an interactive effect. To explore this, we interact I/B/E/S expected long-term
growth and insider sales. The sign on the interaction term is positive, as expected, but only mar-
ginally significant (p-value = .109; not tabulated).
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The median insider sales by managers is zero (see Table 1). Therefore, in the
second column of results, we re-estimate Eq. 2 with only non-zero insider sales
(following for example, Rozeff & Zaman, 1998; Piotroski & Roulstone, 2005). Re-
sults are similar, suggesting that the magnitude (and not just occurrence) of next
quarter insider sales matters in explaining whether the firm just meets or misses this
quarter’s forecast.
3.1.1 The endogenous nature of insider sales
As we have discussed above, managerial sales may simply be a result of a passive
response to meeting analyst forecasts—managers sell following good performance.
One way to address this issue is to conduct a two-stage least squares approach
where we explicitly model insider trading; the feasibility of this approach relies
heavily on the validity of the model (Larcker & Rusticus, 2005). We explore this
avenue by first forming a first-stage model of managerial sales. We include lagged
insider sales, contemporaneous non-manager insider sales, the number of stock
options granted and exercised, and the ownership percentage of managers in the
prior year. We also adjust for past market movements (Rozeff & Zaman, 1998)
and short-term stock price run-up (Heath et al., 1999) by including the raw stock
returns of quarter q and q + 1. Finally, we include each of the variables that would
be included in the second stage, from our main regression Eq. 2, since all exog-
enous variables in the second stage should be included in the first-stage regression
in a two-stage estimation procedure (Maddala, 1977, p. 232). We compare the
F-statistic from this first-stage model, 19.15, to the critical value of 26.80 (Stock,
Wright, & Yogo, 2002), and conclude that our first-stage regression is inadequate.
Therefore, we focus our tests on our OLS specification (Eq. 2 above). To the
extent that our OLS specification does not adequately control for the endogeneity
of trades to factors such as performance, our tests of Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4
provide additional assurance that our associations are due to strategic actions
rather than a mere passive response to performance.
3.2 How managers meet the analyst forecast benchmark
Hypothesis 2 suggests that managers who sell shares manage earnings or forecasts to
reach the analyst forecast threshold. In this section we examine one proxy for each of
these actions to shed light on Hypothesis 2. We examine discretionary working
capital accruals (DWC) as our measure of earnings management (e.g., DeFond &
Jiambalvo, 1994) and the unexpected forecast (UEF) as our measure of forecast
guidance (e.g., Matsumoto, 2002). To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate:
ProbðMeetqÞ ¼ f ðc0 þ c1RankðDWCqÞ þ c2RankðUEFqÞ þ c3Mgr Salesqþ1
þ c4RankðDWCq  Mgr Salesqþ1Þ þ c5RankðUEFq  Mgr Salesqþ1Þ
þ c6Mgr Salesq þ c7Profitq þ c8ROAq þ c9Returnq þ c10Returnqþ1
þ c11Volumeqþ1 þ c12LTGt þ c13BMq þ c14SEO$qþ1
þ c15LogðAssetsqÞ þRTt¼1c16tYear þRKk¼1c17kSIC 2DIGITÞ ð3Þ
where Fðc0XÞ ¼ ½ec0X=ð1 þ ec0XÞ
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Variables are defined in Sect. 2.2.3. Because we rank DWCq and UEFq, we also
rank DWCq · Mgr_Salesq+1 and UEFq · Mgr_Salesq+1 by multiplying the unranked
measures and then ranking the product in deciles by quarter. Table 4 presents the
results. As predicted, the coefficient on the interaction term Rank(DWCq ·
Mgr_Salesq+1) is positive and significant (c4 = .015; p-value = .076), suggesting that
the more shares managers sell in the next quarter, the more likely they are to
manage working capital accruals to meet the analyst forecast.15 It is important to
note that this result is not simply due to high discretionary working capital accruals
representing good performance. To the extent that good performance allows the firm
to meet the analyst forecast, this would come through in the main effect of discre-
tionary working capital accruals or our other performance variables (e.g., ROA or
Returns). The significance of the interaction of insider sales and accruals suggests
Table 4 Logistic regression of the probability of just meeting versus just missing analyst forecasts on
managerial insider sales, earnings management, and analyst forecast guidance
Independent variables Predicted sign Dependent variable = Meetq
Logit estimate (Pr > X2)
Intercept –.562 (.149)
Rank(DWCq) .002 (.831)
Rank(UEFq) .046 (.001)
Mgr_Salesq+1 .035 (.017)
Rank(DWCq · Mgr_Salesq+1) (+) .015 (.076)
Rank(UEFq · Mgr_Salesq+1) (+) .001 (.887)
Mgr_Salesq –.001 (.919)
Profitq .413 (.001)
ROAq 6.397 (.001)
Returnq .607 (.001)
Returnq+1 .739 (.001)
Volumeq+1 –.001 (.013)
LTGt 1.745 (.001)
BMq –.161 (.040)
SEO$q+1 1.818 (.182)
Log(Assetsq) .089 (.001)
Year Dummies Included
Two-digit SIC Dummies Included
Number of Observations 11,939
Likelihood Ratio 881.60 (.001)
The total sample consists of 21,952 firm-quarter observations that just missed or just met the con-
sensus analyst quarterly forecast from 1990–1999. Meetq is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm’s realized I/B/E/S EPS beats the analyst forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses
the analyst forecast by one or two cents. DWCq, is discretionary working capital accruals in quarter q
and UEF is the unexpected forecast, equal to the actual analyst forecast less the expected analyst
forecast, multiplied by negative one. See Sect. 2.2.3 for additional details on DWC and UEF. See
Table 1 for additional variable definitions. All significance levels are two-tailed
15 As noted in Sect. 2.2.3, Hribar and Collins (2002) prescribe the cash flow method to calculate
accruals. However, using quarterly data, the cash flow method for our sample period results in a
reduction of more than half of the sample (from 11,939 in Table 4 to 5,204 firm-quarter observa-
tions). We replicate our results on this subset of the sample and results are similar, though weaker
(.018; p-value = .196 vs. .015; p-value = .076 in Table 4). This appears to be due to low power, as the
main effect on managerial sales is also very weak (.035; p-value = .240 vs. .035; p-value = .017 in
Table 4).
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that managers are managing accruals upwards in order to meet the analyst forecast
before selling their shares.16
Turning to forecast guidance, while the main effect of UEFq is positive and sig-
nificant, consistent with managers managing forecasts downwards to beatable levels
on average, it does not appear to be the case that managers who sell more shares are
more effective in persuading analysts to lower their forecasts.17 This is consistent
with prior studies that show that other factors such as investment banking affiliations
are the key drivers of the extent to which managers can persuade analysts to change
their forecasts (Lin & McNichols, 1998).
3.3 Insider trades by non-managers
To test Hypothesis 3, we include non-manager trades as an additional regressor
(Nmgr_Salesq+1) in Table 5; non-manager trades are those undertaken by other
insiders such as directors or large shareholders. The coefficient on Nmgr_Salesq+1 is
not statistically different from zero (coefficient = .009; p-value = .538) while
Mgr_Salesq+1 remains significant (coefficient = .031; p-value = .010). This result is
consistent with Hypothesis 3—not only are managerial sales more strongly associ-
ated with just meeting the forecast, non-managerial sales are not associated with just
meeting the forecast at all after controlling for performance.
To further distinguish between strategic actions by managers and a passive re-
sponse to performance, we next re-examine our test of how managers met the
forecast before selling their shares. If the accrual result in Table 4 reflects mana-
gerial manipulation of earnings, it should not be present for non-managers, as these
parties have little power to change earnings at their convenience. Column 2 of
Table 5 confirms this prediction. There is no relation between insider trading by
non-managers and earnings management. In sum, the empirical results for
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not present for non-manager insider sales, suggesting that
our findings are not a byproduct of insiders’ behavioral responses to performance,
but rather evidence of strategic actions taken by managers.18
16 As an additional robustness check (not tabulated), we re-estimate Eq. 3 and include the ranked
interaction of DWCq with the quarter q (lagged) insider sales measure. The addition of this new
interaction term does not change the results and the new interaction term itself is not significant,
suggesting that our results are not simply an artifact of firms that have more insider sales in general.
Rather, the timing of insider sales matters.
17 Note that these results are not consistent with those in Richardson et al. (2004). However, we
focus only on those firms that just met the analyst forecast, rather than all firms that met the analyst
forecast. Furthermore, Richardson et al. (2004) exclude all observations that met the analyst forecast
but began the period with a pessimistic forecast. If we regress meeting the analyst forecast versus
missing the analyst forecast for the entire earnings forecast region on the interaction of the unex-
pected forecast and managerial insider sales, we obtain a positive and significant coefficient on the
interaction term, consistent with Richardson et al. (2004).
18 Clearly, there are many differences between managerial and non-managerial insiders beyond
their ability to affect earnings outcomes. This test alone does not provide definitive evidence that
managers are actively meeting the analyst forecast before selling shares, but instead complements
the findings in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, adding to our aggregate evidence on active earnings
or forecast management by managerial insiders to meet the analyst forecast.
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3.4 The effect of corporate governance
To test Hypothesis 4, we consider firms with majority independent board repre-
sentation to be firms with strong corporate governance. This choice is motivated by
prior studies (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002) and recent institutional devel-
opments such as the NYSE’s November 2003 report on the new corporate gover-
nance standards for listed companies (http://www.nyse.com), all of which point to
outside directors as a key governance factor. We therefore estimate the following
regression:
ðMeetqÞ ¼ f ðc0 þ c1Poor CGt þ c2Mgr Salesqþ1
þ c3Poor CGt  Mgr Salesqþ1 þ control variablesÞ
ð4Þ
where Fðc0XÞ ¼ ½ec0X=ð1 þ ec0XÞ and Poor_CGt is an indicator variable that is equal
to one if there are fewer than 50% independent board members (Dechow et al.,
1996; Klein, 2002) and zero otherwise.
Table 5 Logistic regression of the probability of just meeting versus just missing analyst forecasts on
managerial insider and non-managerial insider sales
Independent variables Predicted
sign
Dependent variable = Meetq
Logit estimate
(Pr > X2)
Logit estimate
(Pr > X2)
Intercept .360 (.194) –.526 (.178)
Rank(DWCq) .006 (.472)
Rank(UEFq) .045 (.001)
Mgr_Salesq+1 .031 (.010) .037 (.014)
Nmgr_Salesq+1 (insignificant) .009 (.538) .003 (.861)
Rank (DWCq · Nmgr_Salesq+1) (insignificant) .002 (.843)
Rank(UEFq · Nmgr_Salesq+1) (insignificant) .008 (.347)
Mgr_Salesq –.004 (.715) –.004 (.746)
Nmgr_Salesq .018 (.142) .014 (.360)
Profitq .431 (.001) .406 (.001)
ROAq 6.437 (.001) 6.43 (.001)
Returnq .609 (.001) .599 (.001)
Returnq+1 .776 (.001) .742 (.001)
Volumeq+1 –.001 (.112) –.001 (.012)
LTGt 1.845 (.001) 1.727 (.001)
BMq –.264 (.001) –.160 (.042)
SEO$q+1 2.548 (.011) 1.767 (.195)
Log(Assetsq) .067 (.001) .088 (.001)
Year Dummies Included Included
Two-digit SIC Dummies Included Included
Number of observations 21,952 11,939
Likelihood ratio 1,455.54 (.001) 88.37 (.001)
The total sample consists of 21,952 firm-quarter observations that just missed or just met the con-
sensus analyst quarterly forecast from 1990–1999. Meetq is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm’s realized I/B/E/S EPS beats the analyst forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses
the analyst forecast by one or two cents. DWCq, is discretionary working capital accruals in quarter
q, and UEF is the unexpected forecast (see Sect. 2.2.3 for additional details). Mgr(Nmgr)_Salesq+1 is
the net shares sold as a percentage of shares owned, summed over all manager (non-manager)
insiders in the firm. See Table 1 for additional variable definitions. All significance levels are two-
tailed
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We obtain information on the board composition from the Investor Research
Responsibility Center’s (IRRC) corporate governance dataset that our institution
privately purchased. Data is available only for years 1998–2000. If we required a
year-to-year match, we would lose approximately 90% of our firm-quarter obser-
vations (from 21,952 to 2,271). We therefore create a firm specific summary measure
that is equal to the average percentage of independent directors across the three
years, and use this variable for each of the firm-quarter observations in our sample.
This provides us with a much larger remaining sample of 9,889 firm-quarter obser-
vations.
Table 6 presents the results. The interaction between low corporate gover-
nance and insider sales is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = .080;
p-value = .093), consistent with Hypothesis 4. The control variables are largely
consistent with the prior tests. In sum, managers of poorly governed firms are more
likely to just meet versus just miss the analyst forecast before selling their shares,
lending further credence to our strategic hypothesis.19
Table 6 Logistic regression of the probability of just meeting versus just missing analyst forecasts on
managerial insider sales and corporate governance
Independent variables Predicted sign Dependent variable = Meetq
Logit estimate (Pr > X2)
Intercept .587 (.114)
Poor_CGt .015 (.395)
Mgr_Salesq+1 –.052 (.439)
{Poor_CGt · Mgr_Salesq+1 (+) .080 (.093)
Mgr_Salesq .010 (.490)
Profitq .399 (.004)
ROAq 7.698 (.001)
Returnq .834 (.001)
Returnq+1 .998 (.001)
Volumeq+1 –.001 (.102)
LTGt 1.895 (.001)
BMq –.424 (.001)
SEO$q+1 3.826 (.046)
Log(Assetsq) .052 (.028)
Year Dummies Included
Two-digit SIC Dummies Included
Number of observations 9,889
Likelihood ratio 693.63 (.001)
The total sample consists of 21,952 firm-quarter observations that just missed or just met the con-
sensus analyst quarterly forecast from 1990–1999. Meetq is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm’s realized I/B/E/S EPS beats the analyst forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses
the analyst forecast by one or two cents. Poor_CGt is an indicator variable that is equal to one if
fewer than 50% of a firm’s board members are independent, and zero otherwise. See Table 1 for
additional variable definitions. All significance levels are two-tailed
19 The existence of a majority of outside directors may mitigate this opportunistic behavior through
various mechanisms. For example, these firms may be subject to greater accounting scrutiny (e.g.,
Klein, 2002) or have additional restrictions on insider trading (Seyhun, 1998). We do not explore the
mechanism by which outside directors mitigate this opportunistic behavior.
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3.5 Alternative earnings benchmarks
3.5.1 Zero earnings levels and changes
We find evidence that the discontinuity around the zero analyst forecast error is
accentuated by managers’ trading incentives. We now extend our tests to two
additional thresholds in the literature: zero earnings levels and changes (Burgstahler
& Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Hayn, 1995). We re-estimate Eq. 2, our test of
Hypothesis 1, for both alternative benchmarks and do not obtain significant results
in either specification. While one potential explanation is that these two thresholds
do not provide evidence of earnings management (e.g., Durtschi & Easton, 2005),
Brown and Caylor (2005) find that investors unambiguously reward (penalize) firms
for reporting quarterly earnings meeting (missing) analysts’ estimates more than for
meeting (missing) the other two thresholds. Our study’s focus on the analyst forecast
threshold is based on the premise that it is the threshold to which the firm’s stock
price is most sensitive. The other two thresholds are less relevant to our setting.
Dopuch, Seethamraju, and Xu (2003) find that the market premium is highest for
firms that meet the analyst forecast and exceed prior period earnings. In results not
tabulated, we limit our just met firms to those whose earnings also exceeded their
earnings four quarters ago, and our just missed firms to those that also fell below
their earning four quarters ago, resulting in a total of 13,351 observations, 10,529
which just met (compared to 15,186 in Table 1) and 2,822 which just missed (com-
pared to 6,769 in Table 1).20 Consistent with Dopuch et al. (2003), the coefficient on
managerial insider sales increases to .039 (from .033 in Table 3) and is significant,
thus providing additional confidence in our findings.
3.5.2 Examining the location within the forecast error distribution
Guttman et al. (2006) endogenize the population discontinuity in their analytical
model and show that successful earnings management occurs only around the
earnings benchmark, and not in other portions of the earnings distribution. We test
this premise explicitly by comparing firms that just met the analyst forecast to firms
that met the analyst forecast by a lot (at least five cents). Note that, similar to our
original setting, we still have two sets of firms, one that outperforms the other.
However, in contrast to our setting, we expect the performance effect to dominate
here. In results not tabulated, we find that managerial sales are greater for firms that
met by a lot than for firms that just met the analyst forecast (consistent with both
strategic trading and passive performance trading hypotheses). However, we find
that the interaction between managerial stock sales and discretionary working
capital accruals is not statistically significant (Hypothesis 2). Further, non-manage-
rial stock sales are also a positive predictor of meeting by a lot, consistent with sales
around the wider benchmark being overwhelmingly performance driven (Hypothesis
3). Finally, corporate governance does not play a role around this alternative
20 Because the comparable prior period earnings may have been managed, Dopuch et al. (2003) use
a time-series model to arrive at a proxy for prior period earnings. This estimation requires at least 16
quarters of data to estimate. For simplicity and to maximize our sample size, we simply use one year
ago quarterly earnings.
123
S. McVay et al.
benchmark (Hypothesis 4), again consistent with the differential trading being dri-
ven by the performance effect.
4 Conclusion
A key driver of all earnings management activities is managerial incentives. This
study explores whether managerial trading incentives can help explain the earnings
discontinuity around zero analyst forecast errors. We hypothesize that the positive
investor reaction to just meeting the analyst forecast creates a favorable environ-
ment for managers planning to sell their stock, thus prompting them to exert
additional effort to meet the analyst forecast. Consistent with this prediction, we find
that the likelihood of just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast is strongly
associated with subsequent managerial stock sales.
The importance of documenting clear managerial incentives for engaging in
specific earnings management activities is amply clear in the literature. The main
contribution of this paper is that it explicitly recognizes and differentiates between
two alternative hypotheses, using a battery of tests. Our hypothesis is that managers
strategically manage earnings to meet the analyst forecast threshold so that they can
sell shares. The alternative is that managers simply sell in response to good per-
formance. We do not dispute the existence of a performance effect, and indeed the
performance effect appears to dominate in other parts of the earnings distribution;
what our battery of tests indicate is that there is a clear presence of strategic man-
agerial behavior around the analyst forecast threshold.
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